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Abstract 
Science, in particular physics, is a collective enterprise 
and is so because it is, itself, a fruit of the exquisitely 
social nature of human living. So it is inevitable to 
encounter ethical issues in the natural sciences, since the 
contest of differing interests and views is perennial in its 
practice, indeed essential to its momentum. The crucial 
ethical question always hangs in the air: How is the truth 
best served? In this paper we describe some ethical 
aspects of our own discipline of science: their cultural 
context and the bounds which they delineate for 
themselves, sometimes in transgression. We argue that 
the minimalist ethic espoused in science, namely loyalty 
to truth, is a bellwether for the much wider, more 
problematic, and more vital consequences of ethics – and 
its failure – in human relationships at large. 
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Introduction 
 “Knowledge is not a loose-leaf notebook of facts. 
Above all, it is a responsibility for the integrity of 
what we are, primarily of what we are as ethical 
creatures.” (Jacob Bronowski) [1] 
The general outlook of ethics with respect to science, for instance 
physics, is little different from that for any other human endeavour. 
The function of ethics in the study of Nature can be viewed as 
consisting of two parts: one is external to the enterprise and the 
other is intrinsic to it. External ethics in the context of doing 
science, as well as technology, works at the intersection of the social 
good with the promise and the risks carried by scientific progress. 
Despite its clearly value-laden origin, the term “scientific progress” 
is morally neutral from its own internal viewpoint. By “intrinsic” 
and “internal” we identify those processes within a scholarly 
community by which truth is to be found and safeguarded. 
Although, here, it is as professional physicists that we analyse 
various points, regular public reporting makes it abundantly clear 
that ethical issues of concern to practicing physicists apply to the 
conduct of natural science generally. The state of physics is, from 
our point of view, emblematic. 
Turning briefly to the external aspect of scientific ethics, few would 
dispute that advances in knowledge have provided, and continue 
to provide, not only astonishing benefits but also some of the 
thorniest and most alarming dilemmas ever to confront the global 
community. One need only recall the problems set by nuclear 
proliferation, or by environmental degradation through uncritical 
devotion to any single technology as the saviour of a complex 
situation. Analysis of such dilemmas is a much broader and deeper 
task than the one to which we limit ourselves here. In this paper we 
address ethics within science proper. What ideals does the scientific 
ethic embody? How is this ethic upheld? What are the 
consequences of violation? How does human frailty come into such 
abstract pursuits? 
The aims of physics – of science – as a realm within scholarship are 
quite narrow in comparison with the tasks of moral philosophy, or 
of law, or of much humanly oriented scholarship. The reason lies in 
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the criteria for what sets good science apart from the less good, as 
well as a tradition that views its subject and initio as morally 
neutral. Science asserts that its conclusions are strictly objective; not 
contingent upon the observer. There are fields of scholarship, on 
the other hand, in which reflexivity may be central to their 
intellectual processes; a degree of interplay between subject and 
object that renders their study both more profound and more 
formidable [2]. (Some philosophers have challenged the assertion 
of scientific objectivity, but as a claim it is at least empirically 
justified; most of us travel by plane unworried whether the physics 
of powered flight may fail depending on the pilot‟s confidence.) 
Validation in science presupposes an utterly disinterested, amoral 
arbiter: Nature. The ideal of science is to discern and disseminate‡ 
the facts about physical reality; that web of complex interlocking 
phenomena within which, as both sentient and rational creatures, 
“we live and move and have our being”. Even so, such a bare-
boned ideal provides no guarantee of rock-solid certitude. 
Hard knowledge requires sustained uncompromising effort, not 
just technically but in overcoming unconscious preconceptions that 
may be held personally and, often, communally. Again, Bronowski 
finds the words: “Science is a tribute to what we can know, 
although we are fallible” [3]. Upon that sensibility hangs the 
coherence of the ethic that animates science. 
In the following section we review the foundational ideas, and 
ideals, by which the discipline of science – natural philosophy – 
first grew and now defines itself. We draw on some of the earliest 
writing on the method of science. The philosopher-scientist 
Descartes, in particular, argued that ethics infuses the praxis, if not 
the matter, of science from the beginning. Next we discuss how this 
ethic, centred upon the integrity of factual truth, is worked out in 
the actual realm of contesting interests; human ambitions which, 
notoriously, may fall short of ethical perfection. Thus one must ask: 
                                                          
‡ The twin roles of discovery and communication are symbiotic; at its best 
science is a shared, democratic action in which trustworthy knowledge is 
sifted not only by peer discussion, but also in teaching fresh minds who, 
in the process of acquisition, may bring to light facts unknown to 
themselves and to their mentors. 
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What accommodations might we live with, in practice? What can 
never be countenanced? What, indeed, are the bounds on the 
scientific ethic? The fourth section begins with our survey of a 
topical area of modern science with considerable ethical 
implications: nano-technology. We use this to introduce the basic 
kinds of moral problems facing scientists in their daily work. These 
are put in sharper relief by some recent failures of scientific 
integrity. Finally, we end with a summary of our paper. 
Intellectual Origins 
“The heavens declare the glory of God.” (Psalm 19:1) 
Seeking out truth, spiritual, poetic, or scientific, is never dissociated 
from the primal sense of wonder that motivates our searches, even 
after years of daily familiarity. Nor is moral sensibility able to be 
divorced from this because aesthetics and ethics are twin 
intimations, for us, of a coherent and harmonious reality beyond 
the subjective and beyond social convention. Here we take all this 
on faith, as the common ground for moral perception. Its 
explication sits outside our competence. 
On the other hand, the human sphere is largely structured by 
human interests, which may stray far from even an imperfect ethic. 
It can be argued that Nature, by implicit definition, is “perfect”. By 
the same token, Nature exists beyond moral categories; for 
instance, philosophers distinguish between “natural” evils that 
hurt us physically but cannot possess malice, and “moral” evil that 
damages us in multiple ways: in mind and body, and in one‟s core 
humanity whereby the notion of malice enters [2]. 
Human motivations, however, are neither perfect nor above 
morality. To our understanding, the codification of moral issues 
raised by living, in an ideal or at least a near-ideal pragmatic sense 
is the concern of the philosophy of ethics. This calls for clarifying 
the context and authenticity of ideas of right and wrong in various 
circumstances, as also for making their essential distinction 
perspicuous. It is the road to “right thinking”: typically not through 
our desires, but through what is truly coherent. 
Mukunda P Das et al.                Right and Wrong in the Conduct of Science 
29 
 
Insofar as physical knowledge now comes into the picture, René 
Descartes advanced a novel view: 
Thus, all Philosophy is like a tree, of which Metaphysics is 
the root, Physics the trunk, and all the other sciences the 
branches that grow out of this trunk, which are reduced to 
three principal, namely, Medicine, Mechanics, and Ethics. 
By the science of Morals, I understand the highest and most 
perfect which, presupposing an entire knowledge of the 
other sciences is the last degree of wisdom.  
 
One need not agree with the frankly reductionist accent of his 
programme (as many scientists are still liable to do), to appreciate 
Descartes‟ more profound point. In the starkest terms, ethics is 
circumscribed by our own creatureliness, our own physicality. This 
is a reality so “earthbound” – and as such, traditionally viewed 
with disfavour in certain older systems of thought – that it needed 
his penetrating intellect to envision it as not just a metaphysical, 
but as a metamoral fact. 
From there Descartes proceeds to his punch line. The ground of our 
existence and thought may be physical but the spiritual as well as 
the affective and aesthetic superstructures based upon it demand 
the most refined concentration and our highest possible intellectual 
commitment. A less reductionist understanding might receive this 
in terms of Aristotle‟s “the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts”. 
The wellspring of scientific ethics consists in this: seek the truth as 
best as you can; neither hide nor inflate it; defend its integrity when 
necessary. The basic guidelines are no different from those 
regulating the pursuit of all scholarship at its finest. Indeed, it is no 
different from those which underlie the rule of law – of our rights 
and obligations vis a vis one another – in every just society. We 
have tried to encapsulate the scope of scientific ethics. What are its 
bounds? This is a question that cannot be answered by observing 
the practice of science within its own terms. We must look 
outwards to perceive how science is embedded within culture 
itself. Science does not exhaust culture. Culture is decidedly far 
more than science. 
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No long meditation is needed to conclude that the ideals of science 
are abstracted from the wider experience of human existence, and 
not the other way around. Sadly, that does not mean that the 
demands of scientific ethics cannot clash with other imperatives. 
The Galileo affair provides one of the most tragic and enduring 
examples of such a clash, as in our time the Evolution “debate” still 
does, in some narrower religious circles. 
Taking a cue from Descartes, we assume as scientists that ethics is 
grounded in our physical circumstance – yet not logically reducible 
to it. A more modern, eloquent restatement of the Cartesian 
commitment to the human meaning of the physical sciences is due 
to the mathematician, poet and philosopher Jacob Bronowski [1]. 
Bronowski dwells in great detail on the relationship of science not 
only to ethics but to art and literature, attempting to harmonise a 
vision of the whole. In the spirit of Descartes and Bronowski we 
now proceed to give examples of ethics played out in the life of 
contemporary science. 
Where Angels Fear To Tread 
“Science should leave off making pronouncements: the river 
of knowledge has too often turned back on itself.” (Sir 
James Jeans) 
Since Galileo, Descartes, Newton, and Leibniz the sheer success of 
the scientific advance, with its pervasiveness in culture and 
economic productivity, continually raises an insidious kind of 
moral hazard for practitioners: the onset of a certain hubris. This 
reached its climax in the materialist triumphalism of the late 19th 
Century. The temptation still lingers to extrapolate the successes of 
science into ambit claims that science will in due course explain 
everything (one is led to ask: including itself?). Nothing is to be left 
over; every other mode of thinking will be either subsumed or 
discarded. 
A contemporary example comes from the series of science books 
for non-specialists, coauthored by the eminent cosmologist Stephen 
Hawking. A uniquely endowed spirit, Hawking in his passion for 
knowledge has not only opened doors to a possible unification of 
quantum theory and gravitation; his daily monumental struggle 
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with chronic, incapacitating illness, steeled by a drive to arrive at 
deep knowledge at any personal cost, has no precedent known to 
us in the history of physics, and few parallels in scholarship at 
large. 
In a recent book “The Grand Design” Hawking and Leonard 
Mlodinow assert that modern theoretical physics has supplanted 
philosophy, at least in principle, when addressing large-scale 
epistemic questions, such as accounting for the origin and fate of 
the Universe: “Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but 
philosophy is dead” [4]. Do Hawking‟s brilliant theoretical insight 
and formidable personal courage validate announcing the death of 
(metaphysical) philosophy through a vision of an incorruptible 
flawlessness and universality for scientific understanding? No, they 
do not. While in no way diminishing Hawking‟s stature or his 
passion, it is simply that he and Mlodinow are not justified in that 
claim. Their contention is itself an epistemological assumption, 
outside the domain of science and potentially as open to critical 
deconstruction [5] as the earlier, analogous heralding of “the end of 
history” by Francis Fukuyama in the context of geo-strategic 
politics. Here, belief looks to replace knowledge – while attempting 
to pass for realism. 
Stripped of their formal and instrumentalist façades, essays in this 
mode, while possibly beginning in erudition, end in advocacy for 
one or other theory of absolutely everything. But in explaining all 
things they “explain” nothing – at least in the narrow scientific 
sense claimed as their gift. It follows that, by any useful definition, 
they fall outside physics as novel and ingenious exercises in 
speculative metaphysics of a peculiarly old-fashioned kind: 
metaphysics with a blunt axe to grind. 
How is exaggeration of the scope of science an ethical problem? It 
is not the integrity of physics that is misrepresented; it is the 
broader human significance that it undoubtedly possesses, but 
whose genuinely valuable qualities live outside its descriptive 
constraints. The Hawking-Mlodinow thesis amounts to a distortion 
of reality. Limited, albeit robustly testable, claims to a 
comprehension of Nature are universalised without warrant, if 
perhaps unconsciously, beyond what science is actually equipped 
to say. They do this in a kind of romantic vision that may well 
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captivate many, including its proponents, yet which, in the end, 
gains no further scientific understanding. We would argue that, in 
this instance, the legitimacy that is the measure of science is 
stretched beyond its bounds. 
We do not suggest that physicists are alone in the temptation to 
inflate their subject beyond the reasoned constraints of scholarship. 
There are more extreme examples, past and present, notably in 
biological fields such as the so-called neuro-sciences. It prompts 
one to ask: On what basis are audiences enjoined to deprecate the 
discipline of philosophy in any of its forms? It is surely not on the 
basis of an oddly self-negating philosophical stance. 
In our opinion, it is an ethical failure for the integrity of science to 
be co-opted into a sort of beauty competition with philosophical 
tradition; that denigrates the former, not the latter. It obscures its 
proper character behind a set of non sequiturs that make up a 
caricature, not an honest portrait. It fails to elucidate the true work 
of science, for the huge audience of non-specialists who desire, and 
deserve, well-considered information. 
Brave New Worlds 
“There‟s plenty of room at the bottom.” (Richard Feynman) 
[6] 
 
Physics and chemistry provide an explanation for the scale of life 
on Earth. Under local conditions of gravity, geology, temperature 
and so on, we more or less emerged with the right size to sustain 
functional and adaptable brains. Our species‟ endless capacity for 
imagination and foresight, however, radically outstrips our ability 
to explicate it in comprehensible terms (so far). One clear 
determinant of such cerebral functions is the vast combinatorics of 
billions of neurons interconnected through even vastly more 
numerous pathways. It is this very model, drawn from Nature that 
forms just one source of inspiration for today‟s nano-sciences. 
Old allegorical tales, such as Gulliver in Lilliput, became familiar 
friends to most of us as children. Yet not until Feynman‟s seminal 
article [6] were scientific minds directed in earnest to inventing and 
building systems whose parts are hundreds of thousands of times 
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tinier (typically ranging from the size of an atom up to several 
micrometres) than the most delicate instruments one can craft 
directly with hand and eye. Mastering the engineering and control 
of devices at scales far smaller than neurons, will depend on being 
the able to interconnect them (not necessarily by hard wiring) into 
coherent, “distributed” information systems whose combinational 
complexity and therefore behavioural richness might rival a human 
brain. By any measure of technical prowess, this is a very seductive 
proposal – and this is not even to visit the possibility of symbiosis 
between biological and physico-chemical nano-technologies. But it 
is good to bear in mind that this is still fancy, not reality. 
The moral issues raised by the prospect of a mature and widely 
diffused nano-science cannot be minimised; hypothetically, at least, 
we might one day find ourselves sharing our rational space with an 
artificial consciousness superior to, even more nuanced in 
perception than, our natural one. Nevertheless any such moral 
considerations fall outside science and do not differ in quality (nor 
in potential for tragedy) from historical precedents. We recall one 
of the worst to date: the way in which the unparalleled 
destructiveness of nuclear energy in various forms was grossly 
misunderstood, leading to the diplomatic nightmare of curbing its 
spread for wholesale military use. 
As our goal is to highlight only those issues internal to science, we 
look at the formulation and conduct of contemporary research 
policy within the field of nano-science. To what extent has it 
presented a balanced, scientifically informed picture of the field‟s 
importance – and of its risks – in the quest for public and private 
research support? 
To set the technical backdrop for the ethics, we recall two 
highlights in nano-developments since Feynman‟s early sketch of a 
programme. An enormous advance in the ability to control and 
accurately replicate nano-construction came with the invention in 
1981 of the scanning tunneling microscope (STM) by Binnig and 
Rohrer [8]. It is the first in a generation of instruments exploiting 
delicate but highly controllable quantum effects. The STM not only 
serves to map surface detail at sub-atomic resolution, but more 
significantly to actively manipulate – and build to order – the 
fundamental functional units at the atomic level. The STM 
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vindicated Feynman‟s conjecture that true nano-scale engineering 
is indeed possible, despite the STM‟s and all other current 
techniques‟ remaining extremely far from viable for industrial 
manufacturing. (The hurdle, of course, is to exceed a by thousand 
fold or more the massive degree of integration already achieved 
through mature silicon electronics.) 
At the level of high policy, the most significant impact on nano-
science arrived in 2000 with the Clinton Administration‟s 
declaration of it as a major funding priority, enshrined in the 
United States‟ “National Nanotechnology Initiative” [9] (NNI). This 
signaled a global rush by many kinds of entities, public and 
private, with enough fiscal and technical resources to try to emulate 
the US effort, though few of them have matched its size. 
Commitments of the intensity, if not the scale, of the NNI have now 
been sustained in many countries for longer than a decade. A few 
ingenious, if not genius-level, ideas and thousands of talented 
graduates have been brought to fruition. What else has emerged, in 
strict terms of what was firmly promised (the unprecedentedly 
powerful “quantum computer” for one) as the revolution that 
would become a commonplace within a single decade? 
To our mind, the scientific realities of nano-science so far do not 
exactly match the heady enticements conjured up to promote it; 
were this not the case, our tale here would be a radically different 
one. On the contrary it would seem that the ethics which ought to 
underwrite any such massive social investment, namely that of 
keeping faith with sober scientific reality has not been well served. 
Much has been promised, with hardly any proofs of concept; much 
more has been expended, in good faith, over fifteen years or so. So 
far, little has come about to show for it. 
This is not a great surprise as, with rare exceptions, endeavours of 
this nature cannot avoid being capital-hungry and labour-
intensive.§ Yet the solid basis to justify profligacy was missing. For, 
                                                          
§ There is one delightful instance where low-key ``string-and-sealing-wax'' 
physics has outclassed far more elaborate ``big-dollar'' competitors. Geim 
and Novoselov [9] were the first to isolate and study graphene (single 
sheets of graphitic carbon with extraordinary physical properties, and 
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nano-technology has not as yet experienced its own 
incontrovertible, paradigmatic revolution as was the case, say, with 
nuclear developments following the discovery of fission. While the 
eventual harnessing of fission was clearly still speculative in 1938, 
all the cards were on the table as to its real and prodigious energy 
release. Even then, it took the existential threat from an implacable 
enemy to really empower the nuclear project. 
The promise of nano-technology rests on imagination. There is 
nothing in the least wrong with this, since science lives by the 
vision of scholars; but on its own it cannot substitute for the backing 
of hard fact (and, not infrequently, an acute emergency – such as 
global warming) as serious impetus for a sustained all-out crash 
programme. To set up a modest research laboratory costs several 
million dollars and, to run it, a few hundred thousand annually 
over perhaps ten to fifteen years. Consequently this emerging field 
has been vulnerable to strong funding rivalries, and to over-
optimistic salesmanship by most of the protagonists [10]. 
Above, we have covered an instance of one type of bound on the 
ethics of physics and science. To put it succinctly: do not portray 
possibility as reality! It follows that if one lacks both substantial 
and rational evidence for one‟s claim to public support, and a long 
term commitment to the underlying ideal (not simply to political 
manoeuvring), one should not misrepresent a largely imaginative 
agenda as outweighing equally worthy goals that are more 
factually grounded. As with the Hawking-Mlodinow programme 
reviewed above, much nano-technology is a case of faith in a 
nebulous future masquerading as knowledge in the concrete 
present. 
Beyond The Edge of Flatland 
“Judge not, that ye be not judged.” (Matthew 7:1) 
                                                                                                                                    
considered a fundamental building block) by inspired use of plain 
household adhesive tape. Their low-key methodology to obtain pure 
graphene gained them the Nobel Prize in Physics for 2010. 
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A. An academic fraud 
One might say that any ethical failure in the promotion of nano-
science, as we have portrayed it, is a second-order defect. There 
may have been public misrepresentation of its objective status and 
potential but no actual distortion or confection of scientific data. 
First-order failures are those in which the factual integrity of a 
discipline is directly subverted. 
For some time, scientific fraud has been considered an unwelcome 
yet unremarkable activity in certain life-related sciences, 
notoriously in medical research. Typically, clinical studies of a new 
treatment will involve a great amount of statistical processing of 
data gleaned from test populations that are mostly not very large. 
Conversely the error margins are so much the larger so any 
correlation to be found between cause and effect may be tenuous. 
There seems to exist an opportunity to hide any mischief within the 
data “noise”, to colour or even manufacture results hoping to 
cultivate a reputation for innovation and originality, or one‟s 
standing with funding bodies, or indeed purely to survive the press 
of inhuman and quite unforgiving commercial interests. 
It is sobering to admit that the cooking of results – fraud – is not the 
preserve of disciplines where it could more readily be hidden by an 
unavoidable fuzziness in methodology. We are going to discuss a 
severe recent case of scientific cheating within that hardest of the 
“hard” sciences, our own field of nano-physics, a field capable of 
producing astoundingly accurate measurements, with error bars 
much too small to allow space for playing up. The case is now 
known as the Hendrik Schön Affair. 
Jan Hendrik Schön was a brilliant German graduate who pioneered 
the study of active electronic devices made of thin layers of exotic 
organic materials. These layers resemble  graphene in that the 
motion of charges within them is effectively two-dimensional; a 
true “Flatland” world of structures that form the raw material for 
most of nano-technology. His extraordinary results in fabricating 
and measuring these novel organic conductors led to a prestigious 
fellowship at the Bell Laboratories in New Jersey: one of the most 
innovative, highly competitive “hothouses” for ambitious creative 
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young researchers in solid-state physics and the most sophisticated 
kinds of electronics imaginable. 
At Bell Labs Schön continued, indeed greatly expanded, his run of 
outstanding accomplishments in the laboratory. Paper after paper 
on new and unique properties of his organic samples appeared in 
the most select journals, bearing his authorship and those of his 
supervisors and colleagues. The Schön phenomenon was as 
mesmeric as it was meteoric. His star faltered and fell the day that a 
watchful reader noticed that the plots of electrical properties of one 
of his samples, published in one paper, had an astonishing 
resemblance to plots from a quite different material, published in 
earlier unrelated work from Schön et al. In fact this anomaly was 
noted by several sharp readers, who duly aired their suspicions. It 
began to look as if ethical behaviour in this field might have been 
pushed beyond the edge of propriety, into blatant fabrication. In 
short order Bell Labs halted the project and suspended Schön. 
Amid the community furore, the Laboratories commissioned an 
expert investigative panel of senior, external peers. 
Exhaustive enquiries found Jan Hendrik Schön clearly guilty of 
serial fraud [12]. He was of course dismissed for his betrayal of 
faith, and the panel‟s judgments and recommendations published. 
The crushing, albeit merited, punishment of a wrecked career and 
public censure were not the last of it for Schön, however. His alma 
mater the University of Konstanz took the further, to us needlessly 
vindictive, step of revoking his doctoral degree (whose scientific 
integrity was never in question [13]). 
We ask once more how ethics was served, and honour fully 
restored, in the Bell-sponsored investigation. While indispensable 
for upholding the public integrity of our discipline, the inquiry, 
though open, could not help being inquisitorial to a degree and, 
sadly if inevitably, an implicit exercise of establishment 
prerogatives. We conclude that while the ethical standard of 
scholarly behaviour may have been upheld in the letter, the spirit 
of the panel‟s deliberations reveals itself in a slightly different light. 
The official report on Schön at Bell ascribes to him the entire 
responsibility for malfeasance; he was, after all, the one investigator 
who had complete access to the intricacies of the data. Now the role 
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and conduct of his co-authors had to be scrutinized, since they 
must have given explicit assent to their share in the publication of 
the (faked) results. In the outcome the co-authors, be they senior or 
junior, were exonerated by the experts while Schön was left to 
“hold the baby”, so to speak. 
Granted that Schön‟s colleagues were not party to the cheating, the 
clean slate accorded them by the panel of experts begs additional 
questions whose answers are nowhere to be found. (1) Just what 
quality and maturity of oversight should have been expected, at 
least from the senior co-authors, as well as those specialist peer 
reviewers who missed anomalies in the papers which the 
readership evidently did not? (2) The “oversight” was spectacularly 
absent; why? (3) Testimonies to the panel by all the other authors 
assert that they were wholly distanced from the central activities of 
data gathering and interpretation that define every published 
work. Then, being in effect little more than passengers on Schön‟s 
bandwagon, why were they co-authors at all? 
The latter point dwells particularly on the ethics of the attribution 
and due recognition of scholarly work, on which we will have more 
to say. To ascribe, much less to arrogate, to oneself authorship of 
work to which one has not materially contributed, is an easy road 
for many of us to follow for various reasons, none of them 
scientific. Yet it is a form of untruth, rightly seen as scientifically 
unethical. 
On the proprieties of shared authorial responsibility the Bell 
committee appears to have tried to have it both ways, as indeed did 
Schön‟s exonerated senior colleagues. For, either the putative co-
authors were not authors in the true scholarly meaning or, if they 
were, they failed signally in their implied collaborative duty and 
therefore did, and do, indeed share morally the main perpetrator‟s 
guilt. 
As practitioners ourselves, we feel it is not unreasonable to infer a 
certain unconscious element of self-absolution in the expert panel‟s 
exonerating exercise, glossing over a common prerogative of senior 
academics: namely, the bending of the authorship rules (hardly 
ever – of course). It is virtually to confess, sotto voce: “We all do it, 
what‟s so bad about it?” While this may be the practice and 
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arguably a much less catastrophic offence than outright fabrication, 
the physics community should at least admit to falling short of its 
own ideals in this respect. Nobody‟s hands are squeaky clean. If we 
are collectively too arrogant or perhaps too embarrassed to be 
honest about this “small” lapse, our enterprise may not crash but 
the guarantee of its trustworthiness on larger matters is eroded 
anyway. Credibility suffers. 
Whether or not other, possibly more highly placed, Hendrik Schöns 
have been generating further mischief, no-one can say unless they 
are detected. That is pure speculation. But uncovering it depends 
entirely on collective watchfulness so that, in this way, fraud truly 
becomes the responsibility of all. This is not to advocate a 
permanent state of mutual paranoia; there is overmuch of such a 
mentality as things stand already. But although it is trite to say that 
ethics begins and ends with the individual, it is nevertheless so. 
And one lesson from the Schön affair comes as a reminder that 
human frailty, either directly or via the community, never fails to 
be an “up-close-and-personal” issue: one that hovers over our best 
intentions – and perhaps those of our colleagues down the corridor. 
Should one trust one‟s neighbours? Yes. Should one trust them 
when advancing a proposition that is far too good to be true (as has 
happened with regard to aspects of nano-science)? Maybe not. 
B. From Fraud, on to Theft 
Our final reflection goes to the nature of authorship and its abuse, 
which also poses a serious challenge to ethics in science. The truth 
is always to be served. This means not just that the record of what 
we find out about Nature must be honest and open. The record of 
who discovered which phenomena, of who wrote what, is itself 
constrained by the same injunction: respect the facts. 
To indulge in plagiarism, stealing someone else‟s rightful claim to 
authorship is as nasty an instance of theft as having one‟s wallet 
removed in a street mugging. It may even be more serious than 
that, since it robs an author of intangibles beyond a price, such as 
credit for originating an idea. It parasitises hard-won reputations 
and possibly puts livelihoods at risk. 
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In the academy itself, one of the worst social effects has been the 
bad example set before students and junior staff by powerful 
leaders, perhaps at the apex of a university or research institute, 
who end up exposed as plagiarists themselves. Their high office 
may require them to adjudicate cases of plagiarism by students and 
at times by scholars, who are all accountable to the hierarchy. It is 
the worst hypocrisy when a plagiarist censures another plagiarist, 
the latter paying the due penalty while their judge may go 
unscathed. But not always! 
Monash University in Melbourne was forced in 2002 to seek the 
resignation of its vice-chancellor, Professor David Robinson, 
following confirmation that he had engaged in plagiarism in the 
writing of two books during his previous academic career in Britain 
[14]. A similar case from 2003 in India [15] provoked the enforced 
resignation of Professor B. S. Rajput, vice-chancellor of Kumaon 
University, but only after an international appeal to the President 
of India via a letter signed by four Nobel laureates. Though the 
Professor attempted to blame a student for the plagiarism – in its 
entirety – of a paper previously published in Physical Review D in 
1996, it was ascertained that the responsibility for the breach was 
his. Much more recently [16], the Science Adviser to the Prime 
Minister of India has also come under scrutiny over implications of 
plagiarism, in relation to which he has issued an apology for his 
unwitting involvement. 
How many scientists, who believe and assent to the normative role 
of ethics in their field, act to make sure that this role remains 
robustly in its central place? How to deal constructively with fraud, 
plagiarism, and other transgressions? We cannot offer any 
systematic theory of how ethics should be protected. Much less can 
we, nor would we wish to, offer all-encompassing solutions. We 
decline to do so convinced that, just like charity, ethical behaviour 
begins at home. That is, our hope rests first in a continuing attempt 
to behave as honestly as one can in one‟s own academic life. For 
instance, an honest peer reviewer is bound to set aside any 
antipathy, either personal or intellectual, to assess a submission on 
its terms. Others will likewise judge more properly whether a 
scientific life is lived usefully; but we are masters of our own 
conscience here. 
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Second, it is crucial to communicate to students, passionately and 
with conviction, the ethic of our discipline contemporaneously with 
its technical intricacies. In fact this is a natural part of teaching; one 
does not need to delve too far into any worthwhile subject to 
discover that lazy solutions invite the cutting of corners, and that 
cutting corners invites playing fast and loose with the integrity of a 
methodology. These pitfalls are not mere abstractions, but engage a 
student‟s personal sense of what it is “right” to do. While, in this 
vein, the ethical pedagogy may emerge more or less smoothly, its 
lesson may still prove to be a stony path. So be it; the scientific ethic 
demands no less but, at least, perfection is not the prerequisite to 
our faithfulness. As countless saints have shown it is the latter that 
holds the key to the former, so we have hope for good. 
Summary 
“Every judgment in science stands on the edge of error, and 
is personal.” (J. Bronowski” [1] 
“Elegance is not what we are trying for.” (Ludwig 
Wittgenstein) [11] 
 
At the end of this paper we turn to words of Bronowski again, and 
of Wittgenstein. We have stressed two aspects of the scientific ethic. 
We have recalled the rigid standard to which honest science is 
called, one no less demanding than every other ethical system 
developed to deepen and broaden our lives. At the same time, this 
is a deliberately limited ethic whose intent is to foster specific 
knowledge rather than generalized belief: a preference for 
answering the “how” ahead of the “why”, even though these often 
interpenetrate each other. 
Humans are chronically incomplete. We undershoot our own ideals 
all the time and always will, because the criteria for what is ideal 
move forward through our own striving toward them. Yet we do 
not despair. We seek what is perfect even knowing that our 
finiteness may trap us, and that today‟s flash of insight anyway will 
be superseded tomorrow. 
It is in collective wisdom that we find not just solace but an 
antidote to fallible subjectivity and a measure of objective 
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consistency, as Bronowski goes on to assert. Some Christians like to 
say that they are not perfect, just forgiven. Likewise, physicists and 
scientists in general might well say that they are not perfect, just 
upheld in honesty by the integrity of their scholarly community. 
Science has fallen short more often than history records (we all 
have anecdotes, intimations that we keep to ourselves). Above, we 
have reviewed some failures in our present time. 
They are not pretty, and further analysis is needed though it might 
give cause for alarm about negative and systemic behavioural 
trends that they revealed. Nevertheless, the fact that someone, 
somewhere, inevitably discovers a concealed failure and witnesses 
to it (often at some cost) gives us precisely the kind of hope that is 
enshrined in the scientific ethic. 
At the end, also, we return to the parallel existence of a scientific 
aesthetic. This undoubtedly exists even if editors of scientific 
journals discourage authors from waxing too lyrical. The point is 
that beauty, like curiosity, informs the sensibility of a good scientist 
(but unless one is Einstein, Dirac, Chandrasekhar or Feynman, 
physicists tend to be shy about discussing this freely). Science, 
however, has an ethic that tells us, as does Wittgenstein, that clarity 
and honesty matter even more than elegance. Many elegant 
theories have proved to be wrong. Not all successful theories are 
distinguished by an incomparable economy and beauty. The ethical 
message, then, is: truth above all. Beauty? Yes, but beauty later. 
References  
Bronowski, Jacob. The Ascent of Man. BBC Press, London, 1973. 
Gaita, Raimond. A Common Humanity. Routledge, London, 2000. 
Bronowski, Jacob. op. cit. Ch. 11 
Hawking, Stephen and Mlodinow, Leonard. The Grand Design. 
Bantam Books, New York, 2010. 
Tallis, Raymond. “Philosophy isn‟t dead yet.” The Guardian, 
London, 27 May 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2013/may/27/physics-philosophy-
quantumrelativity-einstein. 
Mukunda P Das et al.                Right and Wrong in the Conduct of Science 
43 
 
Feynman, Richard P., “Plenty of Room at the Bottom” Engineering 
and Science (Caltech), XXIII, 5 (1960). See also 
http://feynman.caltech.edu/plenty.html. 
 “Graphene Researchers Geim and Novoselov Win Nobel Prize in 
Physics” ScientificAmerican.com, 5 October 2010. 
Web.  http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=geim
-novoselov-physics-novel 
"The Nobel Prize in Physics 1986". Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 
2014. Web. 7 Jan 2015. http://www.nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/ physics/laureates/1986/ 
National Nanotechnology Initiative: The Initiative and its 
Implementation Plan, NSTC NSET Report, July 2000. NSTC-NNI 
Subcommittee, Washington, 2000. Web. http://www.nano.gov/ 
node/243 
Lok, Corie. “Nanotechnology: Small Wonders” Nature 467, 18 
(2010). doi:10.1038/467018a. 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. Blackwell, Oxford, 
1958. 
University of Toronto. “Report of the Investigation Committee on 
the Possibility of Scientific Misconduct in the Work of Hendrik 
Schön and Coauthors”, September 2002. Web. 
http://www.engineering.utoronto.ca/Assets/AppSci+Digital+Assets/p
df/GradStudents+Ethics/Schoen_Full+Report.pdf 
 “ Schön scandal.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Inc. 8 December 
2014. Web. 28 January 2015 
 “Great Moments in Academic Fraud.” TheAustralian.com. 5 July 
2012. Web. 7 Jan 2015.   
 “Scientific Plagiarism in India.” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
Inc. 3 Jan 2015. Web. 7 Jan 2015. 
 “No Science in „Cut and Paste‟.” The Hindu. 10 March 2012. Web. 7 
Jan 2015.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
